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Constitutional Specificity, Unwritten
Understandings and Constitutional Agreement

1.

Introduction

When do constitutional designers specify details and when do they not? This
is an important question for understanding what stands behind the written
constitution. One might think, as is frequently argued, that the real work in
the constitutional order is accomplished by the shared understandings of the
subjects of the constitution, who must cooperate to make it effective. These
unwritten understandings form the background against which the text is
written, and provide the basis for the enforcement of the document thereafter.
The relationship between these background understandings and the content
of the constitutional text is the subject of this paper. It draws on a large new
database to examine constitutional specificity, under the assumption that
understanding what constitutional drafters choose to write down can provide
some clues as to why they write at all.
Most analysts agree that constitutions are not “magic words” that become
effective simply through their pronouncement. Rather, constitutional texts may
be effective only to the extent that they embody higher-order understandings
that actually operate to constrain power. As Edwin Corwin wrote in 1936
(quoting Judge Cooley), the Constitution “is not the cause, but consequence,
of personal and political freedom; it grants no rights to the people but is a

*

This paper is based on discussions with Robert Cooter, Zachary Elkins and James Melton. It
draws on our large empirical project, the Comparative Constitutions Project, at the University
of Illinois, that collects and analyzes all constitutions of independent nation-states since 1789.
More information is available at <netfiles.uiuc.edu/zelkins/constitutions>. Thanks to Rosalind
Dixon for helpful comments.
A. SAJÓ & R. UITZ (EDS.), Constitutional Topography: Values and Constitutions, 69-93.
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creature of their power.”1 Constitutions in this view have no independent
causal efficacy.
But this view may overstate the case, as it leads one to question why a
written constitution is needed at all. Since most nation states have adopted
formal, discrete written constitutions, we can assume that there is some
functional rationale for the practice. A certain degree of specificity is needed,
regardless of one’s theory of what it is that constitutions actually do. At least
three general functions are usually ascribed to constitutions. First of all, they
serve to constrain the government and provide substantive and procedural
limitations on its actions. Second, constitutions express fundamental values of
the polity. This is a definitional function, helping to construct and constitute
the nation. Third, constitutions elaborate the institutions of government,
defining the structure of power in the state. This is a distinct function from
constitutional limitation: even governments that govern without constraint
need to define the institutions through which governmental processes will
operate. While these various functions may have different relationships with
specificity, all benefit from writing with some level of elaboration.
Ultimately, we cannot observe the unwritten social and political agreement
that many argue forms the true locus of a country’s constitution. We are
forced, it seems, to scour the “big-C” constitution for clues about the “small-c”
constitution. It is in this spirit that we proceed here. We begin by reviewing
some basic facts on the length and scope of constitutions, and then review
the recent literature on why constitutional texts are adopted at all. We then
develop a distinction between scope and detail, two different aspects of
what we are calling specificity, and present some empirical evidence on the
determinants of these concepts. The final section considers the implications
for constitutional values, the central topic of this volume.

2.

Some Basic Facts

Constitutional documents differ widely in both detail and scope. Bhutan’s
1908 document is the shortest national constitution yet produced, a scant 165
words in length, providing virtually no detail on the operation of government.
The United States Constitution of 1789 (7762 words) has been the basis
for remarkably stable set of institutions, leading Americans to internalize
Madison’s stated preference for short, framework-oriented constitutions.2 At
1
E. Corwin, The Constitution as Instrument and as Symbol, 30 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1071, at
1071 (1936).
2
J. Madison, Vices of the Constitutions of the United States (1787); see also D. J. Elazar,
Constitution-Making: The Preeminently Political Act, in D. J. Elazar (Ed.), Constitutionalism:
The Israeli and American Experiences, 3 (1990); C. Hammons, Was James Madison Right?
Rethinking the American Preference for Short Framework Constitutions, 93 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.
831 (1999).
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the other end of the spectrum, India’s Constitution, frequently amended, has
swelled to 117,820 words with an extensive set of schedules; Brazil’s 1988
document is 59,916 words and constitutionalizes many aspects of political
life. Tiny Tuvalu has more words in its constitution (36,641) than residents
(11,992).3
Sometimes brevity can be explained as a matter of style. Socialist
constitutions, such as China’s 1975 document (2923 words) or Cambodia’s
1976 Khmer Rouge Constitution (1559), tend to be short and programmatic,
though they have tended to become longer since the 1970s. Perhaps this brevity
reflects Pashukanis’ ideal that the constitution would itself wither away with
law as true communism was achieved: Mongolia’s 1960 document explicitly
provides that the constitution will be abolished when there is no longer a need
for the state.4 One the other hand, socialist countries tend to devote more
attention to the preamble than to the description of government organs or the
promulgation of rights: of the fifteen constitutions in our sample that have
preambles of more than 1000 words, five are socialist and another (Iran) is
a highly ideological constitution. The Yugoslav Constitution of 1974 had a
preamble of over 6000 words, longer than roughly one fifth of all national
constitutions!
Figure 1 below presents some descriptive statistics on the number of words in
a sample of 501 constitutions coded by the Comparative Constitutions Project.
As one can see, civil-law countries tend toward more concise constitutions,
notwithstanding a Latin American trend toward verbosity. Common law
constitutions are long, as a result of parliamentary drafting conventions: many
of them were adopted as acts of parliament granting independence, and British
statutes are longer than their continental counterparts.5
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Number of Words in the Constitution
Median

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

N

All Constitutions

10038

14565

13851

862

146385

501

Common Law

25046

27899

20033

2135

146385

109

Civil Law

8505

10858

8514

862

64583

343

Latin America

11554

16022

11471

1377

64583

144

Non-Latin America

9170

13977

14677

862

146385

357

3

As does Nauru (13,000 words for a population of 10,000).
Constitution of Mongolia, Art. 94 (1960); see generally E. Pashukanis, General Theory of
Law and Marxism (1924).
5
R. Cooter and T. Ginsburg, Leximetrics: Or Why the Same Laws Are Longer in Some
Countries than Others, Illinois Law and Economics Working Papers Series, No. LE03-012,
available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=456520>.
4
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Constitutions seem to be getting longer over time. Figure 2 below presents
scatterplots showing the number of words per constitution across time. The
figures differentiate between different parts of the constitution. The upper left
scatterplot is total length; the lower left is the preamble only; the lower right is
the rights section only; and the upper right is all words except the preamble and
rights sections (which I interpret as the amount of text devoted to specifying
powers). For each scatterplot, the fitted line tracks the trend over time.
Figure 2: Verbosity over Time

One can see the general upward trend in all categories of constitutional text.
The slope of the fitted lines provides some clue as to the source of overall
growth. Preambles, it seems, are not rising as rapidly as sections on rights
and powers, perhaps reflecting the decline of ideological constitutions.6 One
also sees that the variance in constitutional provisions on rights is much less
than in the section on powers. There are some outliers in the rights figure, but
fewer of them. These patterns suggest that the form and extent of specificity
are worth further inquiry.
6
S. Arjomand, Law, Political Reconstruction and Constitutional Politics, 18 Int’l Sociology
7 (2003); S. Arjomand, Constitutions and the Struggle for Political Order: A Study in the
Modernization of Political Traditions, 33 Eur. J. Sociology 39 (1992).
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Why a Text?

Constitutions are typically, though not always, embodied in a single
constitutional text that is authored in a discrete process.7 To be sure, there are
important exceptions, such as the constitutions of the United Kingdom, Israel,
and Canada. But these exceptions serve to prove the rule that documents called
constitutions are part of the ordinary way of being a nation-state.
Of course, even in countries that enjoy a discrete constitutional text,
there may be many other documents that supplement the text and provide
for the actual set of constitutional rules. These might include so-called
“super-statutes” that provide for core aspects of governance and are de facto
unamendable. Supreme court decisions obviously supplement the formal text.
Declarations of independence and other symbolic documents may be seen
as playing similar functions of constituting the polity. These documents can
unfold over time and give pause to the dominant view of constitution-making
as a discrete act of a particular moment.
This leads to the next question: why even bother with a constitutional
text at all? Surely, a text is neither necessary nor sufficient for meaningful
constitutional constraints on political actors. We all know of constitutions,
such as those of contemporary Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, that have
beautiful provisions on paper that are not effective in practice.8 We also have
examples of countries – Australia comes to mind – that manage to enjoy a high
level of protection of rights without any rights provisions in the constitution.
If this is true of rights, it might be true of other features of the constitution as
well.
One answer to this question is given in a recent line of interdisciplinary
scholarship that emphasizes the coordinating function of constitutional text.9
Drawing on non-cooperative game theory, a number of political scientists
and economists understand constitutions as conventions, in which ultimate
effectiveness is determined by the players themselves rather than external
actors. The basic insight is that in negotiating over the constitution, any of
several outcomes might be stable, but players have different preferences as
7

For exceptions see M. Palmer, What is New Zealand’s Constitution and Who Interprets
It? Constitutional Realism and the Importance of Public Office-Holders, 17 Public L. Rev.
133 (2006); M. Palmer, Using Constitutional Realism to Identify the Complete Constitution:
Lessons from an Unwritten Constitution, 54 Am. J. Comp. L. 587 (2006) (New Zealand);
R. Aba-Namay, The Recent Constitutional Reform in Saudi Arabia, 42 Int’l and Comp. L. Q.
295 (1993) (Saudi Arabia); A. King, The British Constitution (2007).
8
One might here invoke the Russian joke: What is the difference between the Soviet and
American Constitution? The Soviet Constitution provides for freedom of speech, while the
American Constitution provides for freedom after speech.
9
J. Carey, Parchment, Equilibria, and Institutions, 33 Comp. Polit. Stud. 735 (2000);
R. Hardin, Why a Constitution?, in B. Grofman & D. Wittman (Eds.), The Federalist Papers and
the New Institutionalism 100 (1989).
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to which outcome would be their first choice. The important thing for players
is to coordinate their behavior, notwithstanding different distributional
consequences: everyone is better off with some agreement than with none,
even if they might prefer a different set of institutions than that which obtains.
In the constitutional context, parties to a bargain might differ over the
details but agree on the general outline of their institutions. Citizens may agree
on broad principles of their society, such as that political power be organized
in a democratic fashion, without agreeing on the type of electoral system or
particular federal design. Should we organize our democratic institutions along
the lines of a parliamentary system or a presidential one? Should minorities be
given special territorial accommodations? Or to take a more obscure example,
should the rights of reindeer herders be given special protection?10 These
questions are likely to have immediate distributive consequences for important
political actors. They may be bargained over with intensity and passion. Once
a choice has been made, however, all may have an interest in maintaining
the bargain to avoid the conflict and costs associated with producing a new
bargain.
Many other types of constitutional problems are relatively low-stakes
issues for which many possible answers would be more or less equally
acceptable. The important thing for these kinds of questions is that we have
some agreement in society regarding which of the many possible answers we
will utilize. For example, it may make little difference whether a constitution
stipulates a minimum age for legislators of 24, 25 or 26 years, or what the
national anthem ought to be. But it is important that a constitution give some
answer, and whatever answer is chosen is likely to generate relatively little
controversy thereafter. As David Strauss has noted, it is sometimes more
important that matters be settled than that they be settled right.11
Such constitutional provisions clearly do matter in a counterfactual sense:
in the absence of a provision, much social and political energy will be wasted
in debating what may in fact be fairly trivial matters. In this sense, constitutions
matter not only by restraining power but by preventing endless conflict over
relatively minor issues.12 They do so in both cases by coordinating behavior
and creating common knowledge.
The problem is that the parties to a constitutional bargain, be they citizens
or a sub-group of the elite, have disparate interests and will be unlikely to reach
agreement on their own as to what the constitution requires in any particular
case, whether a particular action constitutes a violation of the constitution,
and on when and how to enforce the bargain. It is important that the subjects
10

Constitution of Sweden, Art. 2(20).
D. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 112 Yale L. J. 1717,
at 1719 (2003); the quote is also attributed to Justice Brandeis, Burnet v. Coronado Oil and Gas
Co., 285 U.S. 383, at 496 (1932) (dissenting).
12
Strauss, id.
11
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of the constitution coordinate their expectations among themselves to make
the constitution effective. But coordination is very difficult among a large and
diverse group of subjects.
Writing can assist subjects to overcome the coordination problem by
providing a definition of what the constitution requires and thus providing
a focal point for political and enforcement activity.13 By stipulating the rules
and defining violations, writings increase everyone’s perceived likelihood
that others will join them in enforcing the rules against violators. Hence
“parchment barriers” may matter, not because of any magical power contained
in their words but because their role in facilitating coordination on the part of
potential enforcers, who may otherwise be unable to agree.
This framework helps us understand why written constitutions may be
important components of constitutional democracy: they provide the focal
point for coordination and enforcement. The written text serves as a focal
point for coordinating, thereby eliminating potential disagreements and
providing a structure for future interaction.14 Although it is ultimately the
collective understanding of the citizenry that does the work in enforcing the
constitution, the text helps make this possible.
It bears repeating that the coordinating function need not be played by
a written text. It is perfectly possible that common understandings of the
constitution will focus on unwritten norms as opposed to the written text. It
may also be that understandings of the text deviate significantly from the clear
meaning of the words. In such situations, the written constitution may stand in
an ambiguous semiotic relationship with the “real” or unwritten constitution.
The important thing is that coordination does in fact occur, whatever its origin.
But all else being equal, writing will help citizens to agree on what constitutes
a violation, memorializing the unwritten understandings that are what in fact
sustain political society.
Let us take a brief detour to consider unwritten constitutional rules, which
are of continuing fascination to scholars. A crucial variable for understanding
the reasons for constitutional specificity is the relationship between written
and unwritten norms that have constitutional impact, meaning they provide
limits and enforcement mechanisms that empower and constrain state actors.
Unwritten constitutional norms may be precedents or understandings that
are relatively enduring over time.15 For example, the French people seem
to periodically take to the streets to demonstrate against their government
when constitutional norms are transgressed. In Thailand, there are unwritten
understandings on the role of the monarchy and the manner of carrying out

13

Carey, supra note 9, at 757.
Strauss, supra note 11, at 1731-1735.
15
E. Posner & A. Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. Penn. L. Rev. 991, at 999
(2008).
14
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military coups.16 In the United States, unwritten understandings include the
long-standing practice, eventually undermined by Franklin Roosevelt, that no
President would stand for a third term.17 Roosevelt’s violation of this norm,
though of course endorsed by a majority of the American public, led to a
subsequent codification of the previous unwritten understanding, in the 22nd
Amendment.18
If unwritten constitutional understandings are universally known and
understood, there may be no need to formalize the constraints in writing. This
is the frequent justification for the British “unwritten” constitution (though
there is much more writing to the British constitution than Americans generally
appreciate).19 It may, for example, go without saying that the American
President cannot fire the Vice-President in the middle of the term, so there is
no need to write down a rule proscribing the practice.
Sometimes unwritten constitutional norms can explicitly conflict with the
written text. In Australia for example, the Governor General has the nominal
power to dismiss the Prime Minister, but this power has not been used for
the most part. However, in 1975, the Governor General dismissed the Labor
Prime Minister and called new elections because the Senate, controlled by
the opposition, refused to ratify the budget. This modified the constitutional
understanding, bringing it in line with the written text.20 Another example
occurred in France in 1962, when President Charles De Gaulle proposed a
successful amendment of the Constitution by referendum, achieved even
though the Constitution of 1958 does not explicitly allow for amendment
in this fashion. This amendment thus changed the constitution in a formal
sense (by shifting to direct election of the President) and in an informal sense
(by setting a precedent for amendment through referendum). These types of
unwritten rules modify and supplement the formal text, often rendering the
original text a very poor guide to present understandings.21
The problem with relying on unwritten constitutional rules is the same
as that which bedevils scholars who are trying to describe them: what is the
rule of recognition that determines the content of the unwritten rules? It is
not obvious how one distinguishes unwritten constitutional rules from non16

T. Ginsburg, Constitutional Afterlife: The Continuing Impact of Thailand’s Post-political
Constitution, 7 I·CON 83 (2009).
17
Posner, supra note 15, at 999.
18
US Constitution, Amendment 22.
19
W. B. Gwyn, Political Culture and Constitutionalism in Britain, in D. Franklin & M. Baun
(Eds.), Political Culture and Constitutionalism 13 (1995); King, supra note 7.
20
The Labor Party was also punished in the polls, confirming for some the modification of the
constitutional convention. J. Elster, Unwritten Constitutional Conventions, at 17 (manuscript).
21
E. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 Yale L. J. 100 (2008); see also
B. Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1737 (2007). An early version of this
argument is found in C. G. Tiedeman, The Unwritten Constitution of the United States (1890);
see also W. B. Munro, Makers of the Unwritten Constitution (1928).
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constitutional “legal” or social norms. Thus it seems that there are certain
advantages to writing, if only to bound the scope of the constitution clearly.
It bears repeating, however, that the text itself is important only for its role
in coordinating the conduct of those who are subjects of the constitution. A
constitutional rule saying that voting must take place on the weekend might,
over time, come to represent an intersubjective understanding that voting must
always take place on Sunday, or even Tuesday. So long as the subjects think
the text marks their constitutional understanding, it need not bear any relation
to reality.
Over time, the text of the constitution is likely to matter less and less as
a formal matter. As successful constitutional communities of interpretation
develop, there will be drift from the four corners of the text.22 But this does
not mean that the text is unimportant, so long as it embodies some shared
understanding, and serves to constitute the interpretive community in the first
place. Thus the content of the text is of central importance at the moment of
promulgation; over time it may be the fact of the text, rather than its objective
content, that matters.

4.

How Much to Write Down?

Once the decision has been made to write a constitution, a new issue arises as
to how specific to make the constitution, given the scarcity of time and energy
for negotiation.23 Conceptually, this involves two different issues. First is the
issue of scope: what topics are deemed to be of sufficient importance to be
included in the constitution? Second is the issue of detail: for any particular
topic, how much should be regulated by the constitution as opposed to left for
ordinary law? We examine both of these dimensions.

4.1.

The Distinction between Detail and Scope

We begin with an assumption. Negotiating textual detail is costly. It requires
careful drafting and hard bargaining, both of which take time. While it is true
that certain language can be borrowed from other sources, it is still the case
that borrowing takes research and energy, and, ceteris paribus, these factors
increase in the amount of text being borrowed. Thus longer documents are
more costly to produce even if they are not drafted from scratch.
22

Strauss, supra note 11.
We know of only one other study on the topic: S. Voigt, Explaining Constitutional Garrulity
(manuscript). Voigt ties constitutional length to some of the same factors we identify, as well as
‘uncertainty avoidance’ and post-colonial status, because of the need to define state structures
and symbols. He hypothesizes that older states will have less-detailed constitutions because
shared background norms will be greater.
23
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Time is not something that constitutional designers have an abundance of.
Constitutional design typically takes place in periods of crisis, when there are
great social and political pressures to produce a document in a discrete amount
of time. Time pressures, of course, can be helpful for producing agreement.
But when combined with the costliness of negotiation, time pressure results in
a scarcity of attention for drafting texts.
This means that designers must make hard choices as to what to include
and what to omit, and for any given issue area, how specific to make the
constitutional text. The first issue is that of scope; the second of detail.
Scope involves the range of topics that are constitutionalized, while detail
concerns the refinement of the provisions of the constitution in any given
area. Conceptually, we can think of these two dimensions as providing for
a tradeoff: given scarce time, designers can deal with fewer issue areas in
greater detail, or a greater number of issues in less detail. Of course, as time
available for negotiation expands, the tradeoff becomes less acute.

4.2.

Scope

What issues are to be included in the Constitution and what left out is a topic
of great normative debate. There is a long tradition of viewing constitutions
as properly regulating only a small subset of political behavior. In debates
over the US Constitution, Edmund Randolph asserted that “[T]he draught of
a fundamental constitution,” should include “essential principles only; lest the
operations of government should be clogged by rendering those provisions
permanent and unalterable, which ought to be accommodated to times and
events.”24 Randolph might be unhappy to read current mega-constitutions,
which have swelled upwards of ten times the size of the document he worked
on in Philadelphia.
Scope is a dimension which of course will depend greatly on local context.
Germany’s 1871 Constitution devoted a quarter of its space to provisions on
the telegraph and railroad, which 21st-century constitutions would hardly
consider. Sweden’s Constitution might mention reindeer herding, but we
would not expect a similar provision in Singapore. Nauru’s Constitution
provides for extensive regulation of phosphate extraction, hardly a central
issue in The Netherlands.25 Demand for constitutionalization will depend on
the particular time and place in which the constitution is being written.
That being said, there do seem to be some secular trends in constitution
drafting. As has often been remarked, the scope of constitutional rights has
expanded from the 18th-century conception of negative rights to include a
24

See J. H. Hutson (Ed.), Supplement to Max Farrand’s The Records of the Federal Convention
of 1787, at 183 (1987).
25
Constitution of Nauru (1968), Arts. 63, 83, 93. See also Constitution of Kiribati (1995) Art.
119(2.a).
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panoply of positive rights and “third generation rights” belonging to groups.
As these new rights have been “discovered” and instantiated in international
human rights instruments, they have extended to national constitutions. We
thus would expect an expansion in the scope of rights provisions over time.
There are also new technologies of government that have emerged over
time. The idea of constitutional review seems to have been so obvious to the
American founders that they neglected to include any provision for it in the
constitutional text; but with the emergence of designated constitutional courts
in the 20th century, the amount of constitutional text devoted to describing
constitutional review has expanded accordingly. Typically a constitutional
court will be given its own chapter in a constitution, distinct from the ordinary
judiciary. Even more important from the perspective of constitutional
design has been an increase in the number of independent regulatory and
watchdog bodies that are now considered standard. One can hardly find a new
constitution without distinct commissions for judicial appointments, electoral
oversight, human rights and counter-corruption. New constitutional offices
and the independent central bank such as the ombudsman expand the scope of
constitutions.
Finally, a host of new issues have arisen that are addressed in constitutions.
Environmental protection, for example, did not warrant its first mention in a
national constitution until the very end of the 19th century – as preservation of
national property26 – and of course is now regularly mentioned. These types of
issues have led to a spectacular expansion in the scope of constitutions.
The expansion in the scope of constitutions over time is captured in
Figure 3. The Figure takes 49 of the 667 questions from the Comparative
Constitutions Project and measures the percentage for which a substantive
provision is given in the constitution. (A complete list of questions on which
the measure is based is given in the Appendix.) Issues that the constitution
explicitly leaves to ordinary law are not considered constitutionalized. Each
point in the Figure represents a different constitutional text.
As one can see, the general trend is increasing over time and the median
value in the year 2000 is higher than any constitution written before around
1885. While there are some postwar constitutions of very narrow scope (the
1977 Khmer Rouge Constitution has 21 articles, many of which involved
political exhortation), the vast majority seem to address a relatively discrete
set of topics, notwithstanding great internal variety in their design details.

26

Constitution of Dominican Republic (1896), Art. 25(10) (preservation of national property).
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Figure 3: Scope over Time

No theory of what constitutions ought to do can account for their observed
scope. If constitutions are designed to regulate relations between citizen
and state, and provide some inter-temporal limits on government action,
surely they would more frequently include such crucial issues as election
law, which generate great incentives for temporal majorities to manipulate
the rules. Instead, most constitutions leave the management of elections
and the drawing of districts to a political process. Thirty-five percent of
constitutions in our sample do not even mention political parties, which are
surely essential to constitutional governance in both democracies and many
autocracies. Only 20 percent of constitutions in our sample mention central
banks, whose constitutional independence is increasingly considered essential
to macroeconomic stability.
On the other hand, constitutions frequently include terms for relatively
minor matters. Take an issue as trivial as age limits for holding public office.
In 1789, the United States Constitution established a minimum age to serve in
the legislature and executive branches.27 This seems at one level an odd thing
on which to spend constitutional space. If the people wish to elect an 18-year27

Constitution of the United States of America (1789).
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old to the legislature, or a 34-year-old to the presidency, why should they not
be able to do so? Yet 72 percent of constitutions in our sample have provided
for a minimum age for head of state, and 78 percent of constitutions have done
so for legislators. The modal age for heads of state is 35 (22 percent of all
constitutions), while that for legislators is 25 (28 percent of all constitutions).
In short, the provisions from the United States Constitution appear to have
been widely copied, notwithstanding the great divergence in life expectancy
around the world, the vast increases in lifespan since the American founding,
and the relatively trivial nature of the regulatory issue in question.28
This suggests that the observed levels of specificity and detail in
constitutions may in fact reflect shared drafting conventions about what ought
to go into constitutions, and what ought to be left out. This would imply that
particular national circumstances may matter less than issues such as legal
tradition or international relationships.

4.3.

Detail

Detail refers to the depth in which the constitution treats the topics within
its scope. We assume that specificity is costly, and that designers wish to be
economical with the operative provisions of the constitution. What might then
lead designers to draft in a more or less detailed manner?
As with all legal language, we expect that decisions on detail respond
loosely to cost-benefit considerations. There is little need to specify detail for
contingencies that are quite unlikely. Thus a constitution need not specify, for
example, the complete line of presidential succession, but may content itself
with simply providing that a vice-president or deputy executive succeeds the
president in the event of death. This of course leaves open the question of what
happens if both the chief executive and deputy chief are killed in the same
incident, but if we think such an eventuality is sufficiently unlikely, it can be
left to ordinary legal processes or ignored completely. The constitutional text
is reserved, in principle if not always in practice, for matters whose combined
probability and significance are such that the highest legal document ought to
address them.
A related consideration is whether or not we think the polity can work out an
ad hoc solution at the time a significant but low-probability event materializes.
Much of what constitutions do is to control behavior inter-temporally.29 We
should thus restrict constitutional regulation to those issues in which we think
28
Perhaps an extreme case illustrating the trivial nature of the issue was the Constitution
of Syria, which stipulated a minimum age of 40 to serve as President. Constitution of Syria,
Art. 83. When Hafez-Al-Assad passed away, his 34-year old son was the heir apparent, and the
Constitution was modified to allow him to serve. A. H. Al-Fahad, Ornamental Constitutionalism,
30 Yale J. Int’l L. 375, at 376 (2005).
29
C. Sunstein, Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do (2001).
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ordinary processes are likely to produce poor outcomes. If we are confident
in our ability to resolve contingencies in a flexible manner, we should simply
leave the issue in question out of the constitution, and have a more general
constitution.

4.4.

The Interaction of Scope and Detail

Scope and detail are separate dimensions of a single overall concept of
specificity. One can have a constitution that regulates many dimensions of
public life in a very abstract manner; conversely one can have a constitution that
has a narrow scope but much detail. Poland’s 1992 Constitution intentionally
dealt only with the structure of government and said nothing about rights and
duties of citizens. It had a moderate level of detail, but left many crucial issues
to be resolved by ordinary law. Estonia’s 1992 document had a broader scope
but also left much to future law, including seemingly crucial things, such as
how the members of the parliament would be elected and how the military
would be governed.30 On the other hand, Thailand’s 1997 document combined
a wide scope, covering many types of institutions, with excruciating detail,
describing complex selection committees to be set up to appoint every one
of the many independent watchdog agencies.31 India’s mega-constitution has
tremendous detail, but not a lot of scope relative to Thailand or Brazil’s 1988
document. Conceptually one can think of these dimensions as a two by two
box:
Table 4: Specificity and Scope
Specificity
High

Low

High

Thailand 1997
Brazil 1988

Japan 1946

Low

Poland 1992

Saudi Arabia 1992

Scope

The following scatterplot shows the bivariate relations. It demonstrates
that scope is distinct from the length in words, our proxy for detail. Some
constitutions with high scope are very verbose while others are relatively
short.

30

Constitution of Estonia (1992) provides specific articles: Art. 60 [The election of the
Riigikogu (Parliament of Estonia)], Arts. 126-127 [Governing of national defence].
31
Ginsburg, supra note 16.
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Figure 5: Scope and Detail

5.

Considerations of Specificity

We do not know at this stage whether longer constitutions have more words
because they have broader scope or more detail. For present purposes we shall
collapse these issues and treat the two dimensions together, under the single
rubric of “specificity.” We next consider three types of factors which might
be relevant in considering the level of detail to be included: audience quality,
bargaining problems, and boilerplate.

5.1.

Audience Quality

We begin with Smith’s distinction between intensive and extensive forms of
delineating rights.32 Any particular communicative act, be it ordinary speech or
legal commands, is specific to the speaker and to the audience, and thus must be
32

H. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context and Audience, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1105
(2003).
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tailored to the particular common knowledge between them. When a speechact takes an expected form, relying on background understandings common
to the speaker and the audience, it can be fairly concise and economical. On
the other hand, if there are no such background understandings, speech-acts
require more elaboration and precision to accomplish their communicative
task. One can then distinguish between intensive communication that relies
on shared understandings, and extensive communication that is more explicit.
As the audience for legal speech becomes more “extensive,” more specific
forms of legal delineation may be required as processing costs increase.
Extensivity is related to such factors as audience size, degree of shared
background knowledge, heterogeneity, and definiteness of the membership.
Larger, more plural groups, with fewer common understandings, and those
whose membership is not well known in advance, require more elaboration
of the rules. More intimate, smaller groups with shared understandings and
background knowledge can rely on intensive forms of communication, and
require less reliance on definite terms.
Ordinary language occurs in an environment of reciprocal communication
in which conventions are easy to develop and sustain. As Smith notes, “speakers
will have an incentive to strike right balance in spoken communication –
most people are both speakers and hearer and a speaker who consistently
imposes costs on hearers will find himself without conversational partners.”33
Legal commands, however, can not always rely on conventional reciprocal
enforcement, and typically address diverse audiences that may lack shared
understandings.
Still, even legal texts rely on certain commonalities that minimize the need
to specify detail. Consider the legal command “Thou shalt not kill.” This simple
categorical command in fact hides numerous complexities. A more complete
statement of the rule would be “Thou shalt not kill, unless thou art acting in
self-defense, are a soldier in wartime, or are a state executioner carrying out
the sentence of a duly constituted court of law.” For most purposes, the simple
rule of thumb holds, and the exceptions are either generally understood or
specialized enough (so as to be unusual) that it is not worth stipulating the rule
more fully.
This perspective has several implications for constitutional studies. First,
we should expect demand for specificity to vary with the quality of the
constitutional audience. Ceteris paribus, larger, more inclusive, open-ended
political communities may require more detailed texts than more discrete,
smaller groups. There is, however, a corresponding constraint. Precisely
because the polity is larger and more diffuse, it may be more difficult to
actually achieve agreement on any constitution. As demand for specificity
increases, the ability to achieve it decreases.
33

Smith, id., at 1135-1136.
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There is a further implication here. We can think of the identity formation
function of constitutions as attempting to create intensive communities. A
successful constitution quite literally constitutes the polity, giving the people
a common language and set of tools to resolve political questions, even if no
such common language existed previously. This should result in increasing
intensivity of communication. Thus we ought to think of the symbolic functions
of constitutions as striving to increase cohesion on the part of the constitutional
audience, and hence be responsive to some of the same considerations as the
operative provisions of the constitutions.
Smith’s distinction is relevant not only to the extent of specificity but
also the content of constitutional language. We might expect in informationextensive environments that constitutions will contain more explicit limits on
state actors, and use a more imperative tone with regard to decision-makers. In
contrast, in higher trust-intensive environments drafters will be less concerned
with limitation and may be more interested in facilitating political action.

5.2.

Bargaining Problems

The relation between speaker and audience is not the only consideration in
specificity. Besides being legal commands of a sort, constitutions are political
bargains among elites. They may reflect the interests of a few or many,
and participation in their production can be narrow or broad. But whoever
is involved, the process of negotiation is likely to introduce some relevant
considerations that will affect the ultimate specificity of the constitution.
The issue of uncertainty is a crucial one. In the last section, we suggested
that if a group is confident in its ability to make good policies in the future,
it might adopt a very general constitution and leave the details to ordinary
political processes. There are two kinds of uncertainty that are relevant:
political uncertainty and uncertainty introduced by exogenous change and
unanticipated circumstances. The first concerns whether or not a particular
party will be able to govern in the future, or has confidence that its interests
will protected; the second concerns external events, such as technological
change or new international configurations, that may put pressure on the
constitutional bargain or introduce new information that would have been
helpful at the time of drafting.
These two forms of uncertainty produce different incentives in terms of
drafting specificity. If a party believes it will not be in government in the
future, and does not trust those who are likely to be running the show, a
standard response is to seek to write a more complete contract, specifying
contingencies. One might also expect that there will be greater demand
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for constitutional rights, and for institutions to enforce them, in bargaining
environments with this kind of uncertainty.34
On the other hand, if one is worried about exogenous change, a typical
response in the contract setting is to write loosely-defined agreements that
allow for flexible adjustment over time as new information is revealed. If the
constitutional bargain might prove subject to external pressures and forces that
cannot be anticipated at the time of the bargain, this might argue for a more
abstract constitutional text. The parties will be able to specify performance
within general parameters in light of changing circumstances. Furthermore,
the parties will require the flexibility to adjust the bargain to reflect the division
of power down the road.
To summarize, political uncertainty should produce longer documents that
are more entrenched, while environmental uncertainty will produce shorter
documents with more flexibility. When the external environment is stable,
there is unlikely to be significant information on the costs and benefits of
alternative policies revealed in future periods, and there is relatively less cost
to specifying. Of these two effects, we think it likely that political uncertainty
dominates. A party uncertain of its future will prefer detail, whether or not
it thinks the environment will be stable. But a party that is confident in its
political future will likely prefer flexibility, even if it believes the environment
is stable.
We are now in position to say something about the optimal level of
constitutional specificity. Leaving issues vague is a way of postponing issues
to the future; specifying detail is a way of controlling the future. The optimal
level of specificity in any particular situation will be a function of
1) the current costs of specificity, chiefly the transaction costs of
negotiation;
2) the intensivity of the audience for the constitution, which
determines how much can be left unsaid;
3) the benefits of specificity, which increase in political uncertainty;
and
4) the future costs of rigidity (the risks of mis-specifying what ought
to have been left flexible) which increase amid environmental
uncertainty.

5.3.

Empirical Implications

This argument has some empirical implications. We do not make any claims
that actual constitutional drafters achieve the proper calibration between
34

T. Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases
(2003).
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specificity and generality. Nevertheless, it is of interest to see if the theory
presented here corresponds with what we observe in practice.
First, we should expect that audience quality and size are relevant. As the
number and diversity of subjects of the constitution increases, the audience
becomes more “extensive” and hence less liable to rely on background
understandings as to constitutional constraints. The implication is that larger
and more diverse countries will have longer constitutions.
We would also expect that the relevant audience for the constitutional
text tends to be larger in democracies than autocracies, which by definition
involve minority dominance over the majority. This means that the democratic
audience is more extensive and hence more demanding of detail. Furthermore,
the process of negotiating democratic constitutions involves a wider range of
interest groups, even in instances where democracy is achieved through an elite
pact. In democracies, no party to the constitutional negotiation can be assured
of governing in future periods, because of the uncertainty associated with
elections; thus political uncertainty is higher. All this suggests that there will be
greater demand for specificity in democratic constitutions. (A countervailing
consideration is that as political uncertainty increases, bargaining will also be
more costly, reducing the ability to deliver specific language.)
Democratic constitutions may also be longer because of issues of scope.
Constitutionalization involves removing issues from ordinary politics. When
there is likely to be electoral turnover, ordinary politics forms a threat to status
quo policies; by contrast, authoritarians may prefer a regime in which they
can change policies more flexibly, since they will assume they will remain in
control. We expect that constitutional scope, ceteris paribus, will be greater in
democracies than in autocracies, as more topics will be constitutionalized so as
to remove them from the ambit of ordinary politics. In addition, democracies
increasingly are accompanied by complex sets of regulatory bodies that are
defined in the constitution, such as counter-corruption commissions, courts of
audit, electoral commissions, and human rights commissions. Each of these
bodies requires specification in the constitution, and can be considered to
expand scope.
To examine whether these conjectures have any explanatory power, we
present a simple empirical test using ordinary least-squares regression on a
sample of 325 national constitutions, representing a majority of texts in our
database. (The sample is limited because some of the independent variables
are not available for every case). We use the widely utilized POLITY index,
normalized, to capture democracy. We also employ Fearon’s measure for
ethnic fractionalization, capturing the extent of ethnic diversity in a country.35
We include dummy variables for various colonial traditions. As control
variables, we include year, wealth as measured by GDP and total population
(the latter two variables interpolated to cover missing observations).
35

J. O. Fearon, Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country, 8 J. Econ. Growth 195 (2003).
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For dependent variables, we include three separate indicators. First, we include
the simple length in words as a crude measure of specificity. We next examine
a measure of scope (scaled to an interval between 0 and 1), as described above,
capturing the percentage of the 49 major categories of constitutional topics
addressed in the constitution. Finally, we utilize an experimental measure of
specificity that we call “detail,” capturing the extent to which the constitution
treats the issues it covers. This is measured by the percentage of available
sub-questions addressed in the constitution, given an affirmative answer for
the relevant categorical “scope” question. For example, a constitution that
provides for a human rights commission would be coded 1 for that element
of the “scope” index, and the “detail” measure would describe the extent to
which the constitution provides information on the number of commissioners,
their terms, and their powers. A constitution that both provided for such a
commission and answered all the sub-questions would score 1 for scope and
1 for detail for this section of the constitution. A constitution that provided for
a human rights commission with all detail to be provided by ordinary statute
would score 1 for scope and 0 detail in this section of the constitution.
Table 6: Determinants of Constitution Length, Scope and Specificity
Length in Words
Constant

12581

***

Scope
***

-4.16

-1.11***

72.57

.01

.0001***

Polity

676***

.004***

.003***

Population

0.01

-3.05e-08

-1.58e-07***

1.35E-06

1.24E-06

-.29

***
**

***

Detail

Year

GNP
Ethnic fractionalization

5424

0.35

0.006

UK colony

13316***

-.04**

-.03**

Spanish colony

4339***

.05***

.05***

-0.02

-.006

French colony

***

-4360

R-squared

0.48

0.37

0.21

n

322

325

325

***
**
*

***

significant at 1 per cent
significant at 5 per cent
significant at 10 per cent

The regression analysis confirms that constitutions are getting longer, covering
more issues in greater detail. The democracy results are quite strong, confirming
our intuition that democracies need more detail in their constitutional texts.
This result is consistent with the idea that audience extensivity and political
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uncertainty increase demand for detail. However, we observe no consistent
effects correlated to population size, wealth or ethnic fractionalization. There
do appear to be significant effects for legal origin, controlling for the time and
democracy variables. Common law constitutions are longer, but are filled with
language that does little work in terms of scope or detail. Spanish colonies
(chiefly found in Latin America) are also longer, notwithstanding a general
civil law tendency toward brevity. The Spanish colonies are long in a different
way from the British: they provide more scope and detail in their document.
Finally, we observe that French colonial constitutions are shorter, but just as
efficient as others in terms of the scope and level of detail. In short, there
appear to be major differences of legal origin that affect the form of written
constitutions.

5.4.

A Potential Objection: Conventional Texts and Boilerplates

Should we expect that drafters actually achieve optimal levels of specificity?
It is not clear that they will, for there is a good deal of copying that goes on in
constitutional drafting. We know that models are often adopted from abroad,
but even particular language is often copied.36 It is perhaps not surprising
that the paradigmatic phrase “We the People” appears in 38 constitutions
in our sample; but the idiosyncratic phrase “cruel and unusual” punishment
appears in 10, and “due process” appears in 67, ranging from Afghanistan to
Yugoslavia. This latter phrase has a specific historical meaning in common
law countries, and yet has been adopted widely in countries with a different
legal tradition.
This suggests that there is a phenomenon we might call “constitutional
boilerplate.” Drafters may settle on language that has been used in other
constitutions as a basis for their own negotiations. This approach has the
virtue of not reinventing the wheel, and need not be viewed pejoratively. If one
believes that constitutional provisions have been adopted by other countries
based on an independent assessment of their benefits, borrowing can represent
a form of social learning, by which states learn from others’ experience.
Further, some provisions of a constitution may be directed externally, such
as rights provisions that might be designed to act as signals to international
audiences.37 It might make sense for drafters to use conventional forms of
rights language to achieve this signaling purpose.
Boilerplate has the advantage of saving on transaction costs of negotiation.
Furthermore, in the constitutional context, the usual objections to “boilerplate”
in contracts between buyers and sellers – namely that they involve a power
36

S. Choudry (Ed.), Migration of Constitutional Ideas (2007); Symposium on Constitutional
Borrowing, 1 I·CON 177-324 (2003); Symposium: Comparative Avenues in Constitutional Law
Borrowing, 82 Texas L. Rev. 1737 (2004).
37
D. Farber, Rights as Signals, 31 J. Leg. Stud. 83 (2002).
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imbalance in favor of drafters – are less salient.38 On the other hand, in the
constitutional context, there are few of the mechanisms of market discipline
that some believe restrain the use of “inefficient” boilerplate in the contractual
setting.39 We cannot be confident that the phrases that are being borrowed are
in fact the best provisions.
There is to our knowledge no empirical study systematically studying the
existence of boilerplate terms in constitutions. We do not seek to explore this
issue in depth here, but simply note that the borrowing of terms may in fact
mean that there is less local understanding of what they entail, and hence
less likelihood of effective enforcement in practice.40 Our general theory
of specificity is tied to unwritten understandings that sustain constitutional
life. If specificity is driven by boilerplate, it will be less tightly coupled with
these understandings. And one would expect that it will be less able to serve a
coordination function facilitating effective constitutional restraint.
Some preliminary evidence on this issue can be drawn by examining
similarity across constitutional attributes. The Comparative Constitutions
Project has developed a preliminary measure of similarity of constitutional
provisions on rights, drawing from a 92-question section of our survey. For
any particular constitution in our 642-text sample, we measure the percentage
of attributes that match with each of the existing constitutions then in force.
This produces a total of 62,846 dyads. Across all observations, we observe
a mean level of similarity of about .35. This suggests that there is some
convergence but that there is also a good deal of tailoring in terms of the scope
of constitutions. Constitutional texts are not copied wholesale but constructed
in a process that has been characterized as exemplifying Lévi-Strauss’ idea of
bricolage.41

6.

Conclusion

Constitutions work when their subjects have a shared understanding of the
contents of the terms of the bargain. Even if we assume that the written
documents are merely reflective of higher-order norms, the question of the
relationship between the written and unwritten constitutions is a complex one.
What subset of the universe of constitutional norms is written down? Why are
some norms and understandings left uncodified? And why do drafters vary so
systematically in terms of the level of detail they provide?
38

O. Ben-Shachar (Ed.), Boilerplate: The Foundation of Market Contracts (2007).
O. Ben-Shachar & J. White, Boilerplate and Economic Power in Auto-Manufacturing
Contracts, in O. Ben-Shachar (Ed.), id., at 29.
40
B. Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91 Am. Pol.
Sci. Rev. 245 (1997).
41
M. Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 Yale L. J. 1225
(1999).
39
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This paper has suggested some considerations. Writing can help to provide
a coordinated understanding of the contents of constitutions for a diverse
group of subjects. Demand for detail will increase with the extensiveness of
the audience and the political uncertainty among those who are drafting the
constitution; environmental uncertainty will tend to mediate these concerns
somewhat. And the existence of boilerplate and conventions about the scope
of constitutions provide somewhat of a wild card. Because terms may be
borrowed from abroad without significant local input, they may not serve to
coordinate among the subjects of the constitution.
Real-world constitutions may not approach an optimal level of constitutional
specificity, but analysis of that question would require a theory of what
outcomes we expect specificity to produce. One metric of constitutional
quality is endurance, the subject of relatively little comparative research. In a
separate paper, we have found that specificity is associated with constitutional
endurance: longer constitutions survive longer, controlling for a host of other
factors.42 The framework presented here suggests at least two reasons why this
might be the case: first, more detailed constitutions reflect more investment
in time and bargaining costs on the part of the drafters; and second, more
detailed constitutions help extensive audiences of constitutional subjects to
coordinate their behavior, thus ensuring that the constitution can actually be
enforced.

7.

Appendix: Definition of Scope

Our measure of scope consists of the following questions, drawn from the
Comparative Constitutions Project dataset.
EXECUTIVE
v84. [EXECNUM]-How many executives are specified in the constitution?
v157. [DEPEXEC]-Does the constitution specify a deputy executive of any kind (e.g.,
deputy prime minister, vice president)?
v163. [CABINET]-Does the constitution mention the executive cabinet/ministers?
v174. [ATGEN]-Does the constitution provide for an attorney general or public
prosecutor responsible for representing the government in criminal or civil cases?
v182. [EM]-Does the constitution have provisions for calling a state of emergency?

LEGISLATURE
v191. [HOUSENUM]-How many chambers or houses does the Legislature contain?
(Asked only if LEGISL is answered 1)

42

Z. Elkins, T. Ginsburg & J. Melton, The Lifespan of Written Constitutions (manuscript).
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v263. Whom does the constitution specify as empowered to initiate general legislation?
(Asked only if LEGISL is answered 1)
98. Not Specified-[LEG_IN98]
99. Not Applicable-[LEG_IN99]
v276. Does the constitution provide for any of the following special legislative
processes? (Asked only if LEGISL is answered 1)
98. Not Specified-[SPECLEG98]
99. Not Applicable-[SPECLEG99]
v307. [COMMIT]-Are legislative committees mentioned in the constitution? (Asked
only if LEGISL is answered 1)

JUDICIARY
v308. [LEVJUD]-Does the court system provide for any of the following?
v309. For which of the following specialized courts does the constitution contain
provisions?
98. Not Specified-[JUDCRTS98]
99. Not Applicable-[JUDCRTS99]
v362. To whom does the constitution assign the responsibility for the interpretation
of the constitution?
98. Not Specified-[INTERP98]
99. Not Applicable-[INTERP99]

MISCELLANEOUS
v70. [AMEND]-Does the constitution provide for at least one procedure for amending
the constitution?
v384. [FEDUNIT]-Is the state described as either federal, confederal, or unitary?
v457. [BANK]-Does the constitution contain provisions for a central bank?
v487. [HEADFORN]-Who is the representative of the state for foreign affairs?
v490. [TREAT]-Does the constitution mention international treaties?
v538. [NAT]-Does the constitution refer to nationals, subjects, or citizens?
v640. [COMCHIEF]-Who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces? (Asked
only if MILITARY is answered 1)
v655. [LANG]-Does the constitution specify either an official or national language?
v17. [TRANPROV]-Does the constitution contain any transitional provisions?
v29. [PREAMBLE]-Does the constitution have an introduction or preamble?
v49. [TRUTHCOM]-Does the Constitution provide for a commission for truth and
reconciliation?
v53. [OATH]-Does the constitution stipulate that some public office holders take an
oath to support or abide by the constitution?
v66. [CAPITAL]-Does the constitution contain provisions specifying the location of
the capital (if so, please specify the location in the comments section)?
v68. [FLAG]-Does the constitution contain provisions concerning the national flag?
v89. [HOSELECT]-How is the Head of State selected? (Asked only if EXECNUM
is answered 3, or if HOSHOG is answered 1, or if HOSHOG is answered 3, or
if HOSHOG is answered 4, or if HOSHOG is answered 90, or if HOSHOG is
answered 97)
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v192. [STDCOM]-Does the Constitution specify a “standing committee”? (Asked
only if LEGISL is answered 1)
v202. How are members of the first (or only) chamber of the Legislature selected?
(Asked only if HOUSENUM is answered 2, or if HOUSENUM is answered 3)
v255. [LEGDISS]-Who, if anybody, can dismiss the legislature? (Asked only if
LEGISL is answered 1)
v317. [HOCCJ]-Is the selection process specified for the chief justice or the other
justices of the Highest Ordinary Court? (Asked only if LEVJUD is answered 5, or
if LEVJUD is answered 6, or if LEVJUD is answered 7)
v371. [JREM]-Are there provisions for dismissing judges?
v413. [PART]-Does the constitution refer to political parties?
v423. [REFEREN]-Does the constitution provide for the ability to propose a
referendum (or plebiscite)?
v431. [OVERSGHT]-Does the constitution provide for an electoral commission or
electoral court to oversee the election process?
v451. [OMBUDS]-Does the constitution provide for an Ombudsman?
v466. [MEDCOM]-Does the constitution mention a special regulatory body/institution
to oversee the media market?
v469. [JC]-Does the constitution contain provisions for a Judicial Council/
Commission?
v472. [CC]-Does the constitution contain provisions for a counter corruption
commission?
v476. [HR]-Does the constitution contain provisions for a human rights commission?
v479. [EXINST]-Does the constitution contain provisions with regard to any
additional central independent regulatory agencies (not including a counter
corruption commission, human rights commission, central bank commission, or
central election commission)?
v483. [INTLAW]-Does the constitution contain provisions concerning the relationship
between the constitution and international law?
v519. [CAPPUN]-How does the constitution treat the use of capital punishment?
v562. [OFFREL]-Does the constitution contain provisions concerning a national or
official religion or a national or official church?
v569. [EXPROP]-Can the government expropriate private property under at least
some conditions?
v626. [ENV]-Does the constitution refer to protection or preservation of the
environment?
v631. [ARTISTS]-Does the constitution refer to artists or the arts?
v637. [GOVMED]-How does the constitution address the state operation of print or
electronic media?
v659. [EDUCATE]-Does the constitution contain provisions concerning education?
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